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Abstract
Background: The tissue culture banana (TCB) is a biotechnological agricultural innovation that has been adopted
widely in commercial banana production. In 2003, Africa Harvest Biotech Foundation International (AH) initiated a
TCB program that was explicitly developed for smallholder farmers in Kenya to help them adopt the TCB as a scalable
agricultural business opportunity. At the heart of the challenge of encouraging more widespread adoption of the TCB
is the question: what is the best way to introduce the TCB technology, and all its attendant practices and opportunities,
to smallholder farmers. In essence, a challenge of community or stakeholder engagement (CE).
Results: In this paper, we report the results of a case study of the CE strategies employed by AH to introduce TCB
agricultural practices to small-hold farmers in Kenya, and their impact on the uptake of the TCB, and on the nature of
the relationship between AH and the relevant community of farmers and other stakeholders. We identified six specific
features of CE in the AH TCB project that were critical to its effectiveness: (1) adopting an empirical, “evidence-based”
approach; (2) building on existing social networks; (3) facilitating farmer-to-farmer engagement; (4) focusing
engagement on farmer groups; (5) strengthening relationships of trust through collaborative experiential learning;
and (6) helping farmers to “learn the marketing game”. We discuss the implications of AH’s “values-based” approach
to engagement, and how these guiding values functioned as “design constraints” for the key features of their CE
strategy. And we highlight the importance of attention to the human dimensions of complex partnerships as a
key determinant of successful CE.
Conclusion: Our findings suggest new ways of conceptualizing the relationship between CE and the design and
delivery of new technologies for global health and global development.
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Background
“TCB Orchard is my second husband. It fetches me
money as and when I want! …I prefer TCBs because
they don’t have disease, they grow faster, they give me
money quicker than the traditional bananas. So I
decided to plant more and more.”.[Farmer (18)].
The tissue culture banana (TCB) is a biotechnological
agricultural innovation that has been adopted widely in
commercial banana production. Tissue culture (TC) is
based on the ability of many plant species to regenerate
a whole plant from a single shoot tip. A single shoot tip
is dissected and the pieces are placed in a sterile growth
medium. Various hormones are added at different stages
to promote shoot initiation, multiple shoot formation,
and rooting induction. Within 6 months, up to 2,000
individual plantlets can be produced from a single shoot.
TC technology enables rapid and large-scale prolifera-
tion of bananas. TC plants grow faster than plants
grown from nursery “suckers”, are free from pests
and diseases, are uniform, produce fruits earlier, and
the second generation crop also matures earlier. TC
bananas are ready for harvest340 days after planting,
compared to 420 days for plants grown from nursery
“suckers” [1].
The TCB was introduced to Kenyan farmers initially in
1997 through a partnership between the Kenyan Agri-
cultural Research Institute (KARI) (now known as Kenya
Agriculture and Livestock Research Organization) and
the International Service for the Acquisition of Agri-
Biotech Applications (ISAAA). The first two phases of
TCB introduction were carried out between 1997–2003,
during which the feasibility and appropriateness of the
technology were tested and systems of production and
distribution of the TCB were piloted [2]. Commercial
adoption presented a challenge in Kenya because bananas
have traditionally been grown by the smallholder
farmers for home and local consumption [3, 4]. In
2003, Africa Harvest Biotech Foundation International
(AH), a Nairobi-based non-governmental organization
(NGO) that applies agricultural biotechnologies and
management practices to improve the viability of small-
holder agriculture [4], initiated a TCB program that
was explicitly developed for smallholder farmers and
adopted a ‘whole value chain’ approach that aimed to
help them adopt the TCB as a scalable agricultural
business opportunity [2].
Adopting TCB has been shown to increase farm and
household income and reduce relative food insecurity in
Kenya [2, 5]. Despite the advantages of TCB, and the
importance of banana-growing in general in East Africa,
TCB adoption has remained relatively low and uneven
in Kenya, amounting to only 7% of total banana acreage
by 2012 [3, 6]. Most TCB production takes place in 12
counties in the central and eastern provinces of Kenya,
where dissemination programs, such as AH, have been
concentrated [3]. One reason for the modest adoption
rates of the TCB is the special agricultural management
practices and higher input intensities that TCB cultiva-
tion requires. AH’s ‘whole value chain’ approach resulted
from a recognition of these challenges, along with the
demonstrated advantages of improved yields over a
shorter growing period, a lower incidence of diseases,
and greater uniformity of banana bunches, which trans-
lates into better marketability [3, 6]. At the heart of the
challenge of encouraging more widespread adoption of
the TCB is the question: what is the best way to intro-
duce the TCB technology, and all its attendant practices
and opportunities, to smallholder farmers. In essence, a
challenge of community or stakeholder engagement (CE).
In this paper, we report the results of a case study of
the CE strategies employed by AH to introduce TCB
agricultural practices to small-hold farmers in Kenya,
and their impact on the uptake of the TCB, and on the
nature of the relationship between AH and the relevant
community of farmers and other stakeholders.
CE has been recognized as an important factor in the
successful introduction and adoption of new technolo-
gies [7]. But despite a growing appreciation of its
importance, what makes CE effective remains poorly
understood. A recent UK Parliamentary Report on les-
sons from the Ebola outbreak of 2015 in West Africa
[8] emphasizes the need for substantial improvement to
our ability to evaluate the impact of CE in global health
and global development to improve effective employ-
ment of these practices.
We studied the TCB case as part of a research pro-
gram on CE [9] undertaken by the Ethical, Social and
Cultural (ESC) Program for the Bill and Melinda Gates
Foundation’s Grand Challenges in Global Health
(GCGH) initiative [10], which aimed to gain a better un-
derstanding of what makes CE effective in the context of
global health and global development research. This case
study was one of several that examined a CE strategy
that was already considered to be successful in an attempt
to describe and explain the factors that contributed to
its success.
Methods
We conducted a retrospective qualitative case study in-
formed by grounded theory, an approach we have used
successfully in other CE case studies [9, 11, 12]. The
case study was conducted in collaboration with Africa
Harvest (AH) in its TCB intervention areas in Murang’a
County, Kenya. We made an exploratory visit to the
TCB project in October 2007 to determine the scope of
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the case study, followed by an 8-weeks data collection
visit in May-June, 2008.
We used a retrospective qualitative case study ap-
proach [13] to understand the history of the TCB Project
over the previous 10 years and the role of CE practices.
We conducted 16 in-depth semi-structured interviews
with 17 individuals: TCB smallholder farmers (n = 7),
AH staff (n = 2), field trainers/facilitators (n = 2); a plant
biotechnology scientist from a Kenyan public agriculture
research institute (n = 1); an agricultural NGO staff
member (n = 1); a staff member from a private agricul-
tural nursery (n = 1); a senior business consultant (n = 1);
a consultant in community partnerships and group
dynamics (n = 1); and a TCB extension officer from a
private, farmer-owned company (n = 1). These interviews
were complemented by non-participant observation by
SB of three field training school activities at the AH
TCB project intervention areas in the Thika Murang’a
and Nairobi districts. Subsequently, SB conducted focus
group discussions with three farmer groups at three dif-
ferent sites within these districts—Kairi, Muirigo and
Ngorongo— on various aspects of the TCB project, with
a central focus on CE activities. (Table 1) We also
studied AH documents relating to TCB interventions:
periodic progress reports, study reports of its formative
research, training materials, and press releases and
media coverage.
The goal of sampling in qualitative studies is not to
construct a sample that mirrors major demographic fea-
tures of the target population, but rather to identify key
informants with unique experiences and personal know-
ledge of the phenomenon in question who can provide
useful descriptions, insights and explanations of events
relevant to the research questions. Prospective inter-
viewees were identified initially by AH staff members
and complemented by sequential referral sampling. We
approached the prospective participants at their farms or
respective work places with prior appointments which
were facilitated by the AH staff.
The interview guide and the consent forms were trans-
lated into Kiswahili, although many farmers in Kenya
understand and speak English. The interviews were
simultaneously translated by facilitators, allowing
participants to switch between Kiswahili and English.
Facilitators were the field trainers associated with AH,
belonged to the farmers’ community, and were involved in
the TCB project. Farmers’ interviews were conducted at
their own farms. Interviews with other interviewees were
conducted in English at their own work places. Interviews
lasted between 30 and 60 min. In one instance, two
farmers chose to be interviewed together. Interviews were
recorded, translated and transcribed verbatim.
The analytic approach combined techniques of
grounded theory and qualitative description [14–16].
Two main rationales informed our choice of method:
First, grounded theory emphasizes the experiences of
participants, the meaning of these experiences to partici-
pants and their understanding of events [17], as opposed
to seeking confirmation of investigators’ hypotheses.
Second, the grounded theory method aims to generate a
theory of the phenomenon in question. The goal in this
case was to produce an explanatory account that com-
bines rich description of CE in the AH process with
explanations of how various actions and structures lead
to specific outcomes of interest [18].
In keeping with qualitative methodology, data collection
and analysis were done in parallel [14, 19]. Preliminary
data analysis was conducted by SB during the data collec-
tion phase in Nairobi to integrate initial insights into sub-
sequent interviews. Later, upon the completion of the field
work, SB conducted initial line-by-line coding of interview
transcripts using the qualitative data software ATLAS.ti
version 5.2., to identify key concepts, categories, and
patterns. A constant comparative approach was used to
compare findings within and across interviews and be-
tween categories [14, 18]. This was followed by focused
coding and creation of analytical memos, as described
by Charmaz [14]. This process produced a set of the-
matic and conceptual categories. We developed net-
work views in ATLAS.Ti to explore relationships
among the emerging concepts. Techniques for ensuring
analytic rigor and trustworthiness included discussing
coding between analysts (SB and JL), seeking alternative
explanations for the data, and interrogating the coher-
ence of interpretations through deliberations among
the analysts [16]. We drafted a preliminary manuscript
Table 1 Characteristics of focus group participants
Group name
(by site)
Number of group members
who participated in the
focus group discussion
Gender Age Land ownership No of TCB
plants ownedWomen Men
Kairi 8 5 3 33–75 1–4 acres 10–20
Muirigo 17 5 12 39–80
years
½–5 acres with most of
them with 1 acre
5–30
Ngorongo 21 3 18 30–74
years
½–10 acres with most
owning 1–2 acres
3–70
Total 46 13 33
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as a “best fit” for the data and refined it through several
subsequent iterations.
The case study research protocol was approved by the
respective Research Ethics Boards at the University of
Toronto, and the Ministry of Agriculture, Nairobi, Kenya.
Results
The context: Introducing the TCB in the aftermath of
‘breaches of trust’
During 1970s and 1980s tea and coffee cash crops
offered small-hold farmers (smallholders) in Kenya a re-
liable, if modest, living. Farming cooperatives offered a
buffer against economic hardship, particularly for poorer
farmers, and played a powerful role in shaping farming
communities in the country.
“…back in the 70s and 80s…we took pride in ourselves
on having been taken to school by coffee. Because, what
a farmer would do if he didn’t have school fees, coffee
would give him a loan to pay school fees for his
children. If he didn’t have food, the coffee societies
would buy maize…get food on their table… all to be
deducted when farmers received their proceeds.”.
[Agricultural NGO staff member (Interview # 8)].
In the early 1990s, a crash in coffee and tea prices caught
smallholders off guard [20]. The economic crisis had
immediate implications for the normal functioning of the
tea and coffee cooperatives, as falling revenues increasingly
pitted stakeholders’ interests against one another.
“There were issues of corruption…the coffee board was
not operational…Farmers suffered the most since they
relied so much on the coffee [plantation].”.[Agricultural
NGO staff member (8)]
Inevitably, various schemes were proposed by dubious
NGOs, promising farmers better markets and prices for
their produce. Farmers recounted several stories of how
such schemes for french beans, pineapples, avocado,
maize, vanilla, agricultural water supply and collection of
chameleons for export for medicinal purposes resulted
in disappointment and betrayals of the farmers’ trust.
“It was bad because I remember we had planted about
2 acres of French beans…we were to harvest at least
60 cartons per day. They would come and probably
[take only] 10 or 5 cartons. So we used to feed the
rest to the animals…So the idea was just to sell their
crops and then they go. So we have that experience, a
bitter one, yes.”. [Farmers, joint interview (13)].
Struggling for subsistence, and with a reinforced fear
of new initiatives and a deep distrust of ‘outsiders’, the
farmers increasingly turned to bananas, known locally as
a ‘back yard crop’, a ‘subsistence crop’ and a ‘woman’s
crop’. Some varieties of banana, such as the imported
Cavendish, proved to be viable in Kenya and offered
some economic opportunity for small landholders. But
infestation by pests and diseases substantially limited
yields and jeopardized the viability of the banana as a
cash crop [2, 21].
Community engagement towards rebuilding
‘relationships of trust’
We identified six specific features of CE in the AH TCB
project which were critical to its effectiveness.
1. Determining the local relevance of an “imported”
innovation: An evidence based approach
As part of the foundation for its CE strategy, AH
chose to carry out empirical research—surveys,
rapid appraisals, and qualitative studies—with
farmers to gain an understanding of their
perspectives and share the findings with farmers
and other key constituents, such as the MoA. This
approach was thought to be necessary because of
the unfamiliarity of smallhold farmers with TCB.
When TCB was introduced to Kenya by AH in
1997 its suitability to Kenyan climatic and soil
conditions had not been tested and some preliminary
field trials were conducted at Jomo Kenyatta
University of Agriculture and Technology to address
these gaps in knowledge. Perhaps more importantly,
its acceptability to Kenyan farmers and consumers
was not well established. In fact, at the outset of the
program, farmers viewed the TCB as “alien” and of
limited relevance as a cash-crop option.
“Initially when we first took the plant to the field, the
other farmers, and the neighbours were laughing at
them and telling them what they were planting! They
had never seen anything like that because a TCB
plantlet looks like a small flower with just a few
leaves.”. [Plant biotechnology scientist (7)]
Understanding these initial attitudes through their
empirical research helped AH to shape the content
of the learning opportunities it was designing for
farmers. And the discipline of seeking the
perspectives of farmers also signalled AH’s desire
for a respectful relationship with farmers.
“…if your decisions are top-bottom a lot of time they
either don’t work or nobody really trusts them. But
most of our ideas are actually bottom-top whereby we
start with the baseline. We go to the community and
find out what they want…So by the time we are
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writing our proposal and even writing our operational
strategy, we already have an idea of what people want.
I think the MoA (Ministry of Agriculture) likes that,
they really appreciate it.”. [AH staff (11)].
AH’s empirical research also helped the AH team
to identify community based resources, which later
proved to be valuable social capital during CE: “We
also wanted to find out or establish the available
resources on the ground that we can work with…to
identify the ground networks like community-based
organizations (CBOs), field based organizations that
we can work with.”. [AH staff (A)]. AH’s emphasis
on generating relevant evidence also proved
convincing for other key players such as the
Ministry of Agriculture (MoA), which had important
interests in understanding the commercial potential
of the TCB.
THE AH invested in a pilot project to assess the
promise of the TCB innovation in real world
context which proved critical to the TCB initiative.
So the project went on very well and actually we
proved a concept that for sure the TCB technology is
workable. Farmers can adopt TCB which are actually
profitable…And we found that for sure, for every one
dollar you invest in the TCB, it fetches about 3 or 4
dollars back. So we were able to prove the
concept…[AH staff (12)].
2. Introducing the TCB innovation: Building on existing
social networks
AH used several channels to introduce the TCB
innovation, capitalizing first on those most trusted
by farmers: “Because most of the time when you are
approaching a community it’s usually easy when
you use the existing networks than going to start
afresh…Because people trust their own…[AH staff
(12)]. For example, given the high levels of religious
affiliation within the farming communities, AH
engaged religious leaders and churches as one of
their first points of contact with farmers.
“First of all when AH came and talked to members at
church some of them decided that they are going to
plant the bananas. So they were picked and their
names were known. Then AH requested them to go
on spreading the gospel about planting the bananas.”.
[Farmer (4)].
AH leveraged the support of the Ministry of
Agriculture (MoA) by sharing endorsement letters
from the MoA with stakeholders during their
community entry activities: “And we have the
letters from the agricultural offices because that is
our first point. You go through the agricultural
offices to make it official.” [AH staff (B)]. This
strategy helped to authenticate and legitimize AH’s
messages and helped AH establish relationships
with key stakeholders, such as local agricultural
non-government organisations (NGOs), and various
crop or livestock-based financing or management
cooperatives. During our field work, we observed
that farmers generally interacted comfortably and
constructively with MoA staff, likely due to the
positive legacy of MoA extension staff engaging
with farmers throughout the country. These
extension staff were also important stakeholders for
AH as a result of their deep knowledge of the farming
communities.
Not all relationships between farmers and
stakeholders were equally trusting. Particularly for
the identification of implementation sites, AH
devoted considerable time and energy to assessing
levels of trust with prospective partners, and
prioritized those communities where productive
partnerships could be built upon a relatively
trusting base.
3. Facilitating farmer-to-farmer engagement
The TCB plantlet is vastly different from traditional
bananas in its appearance. Unfamiliar appearance
has been an impediment to the successful uptake
of other agricultural innovations by farmers and
consumers, such as with the introduction of
Golden Rice in South East Asia [22] and this was
true also for the TCB. But farmers’ scepticism ran
deeper than the appearance of the plantlet. They
were concerned, in particular, about the need for
trained personnel to carefully grow TCB plantlets
in nurseries, and several other unfamiliar
agricultural practices that made the TCB’s
commercial potential more difficult to understand.
“…here is a technology, those are scientists and they
want to reach the community and that is beyond
science. So we were dealing with all the social issues…
if you want to adopt a technology, it is not just about
the banana, there are perceptions and attitudes… So
the first thing we had to tackle, of course, was the
perceptions [of farmers and communities about
TCB].”. [Consultant in community partnerships and
group dynamics (6)]
AH’s claims about the viability of TCB required
validation for farmers to even consider adopting the
crop. AH adopted the practice of exposure visits or
travelling workshops, to provide farmers with
opportunities to experience TCB farming practices
first-hand. ‘Exposure visits’ typically involve farmers
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visiting demonstration or pilot agricultural sites
developed by private companies, NGOs, or
government agricultural research institutes.
Farmers take part in demonstrations and have an
opportunity to ask questions of the organizers and
peer farmers who have been early adopters of the
new practices. These strategies were used by the
Kenyan Ministry of Agriculture (MoA) and
government institutes such as Kenya Agricultural
Research Institute (KARI), to introduce new
practices to Kenyan farmers.
“So it was easier because a few farmers had walked
through the whole cycle. So when it was the time for
mass adoption, we gravitated around pilot sites. So
that became easier because there was something they
could see…just creating a desire and in the process
their attitude would change. They would say ‘oh, I will
try’…Exposure trips worked wonders…So, in fact, that
was the most effective. So they were saying this is
someone we know, it is so and so’s father but look, his
is also doing well…”.[Consultant in community
partnerships and group dynamics (6)]
“So we were convinced that if those farmers are able, just
the way I am talking now, I am talking from experience.
They talked from experience. And having been farmers
all the way through when somebody talks we could
actually understand.”. [Farmers, joint interview (13)]
Exposure visits made the potential benefits of the
TCB innovation evident to interested farmers and
offered them engagement with other farmers who
had already adopted the TCB, sometimes from
within their own social networks, offering an
opportunity to assess the merits of AH’s claims.
One of the farmers’ genuine concerns was about
viable markets for their bananas, a concern rooted
in past bitter disappointments. An AH staff
member recounted the farmers’ scepticism:
“…you have been sent from Nairobi to come and tell
us to plant bananas and then after we plant, you go
back to Nairobi. Where are we going to take the
produce?” But we [AH team] kept on assuring them,
we are with you here 3 days in a week and we will be
listening to your concerns and we are going to try and
see how you can work together.”. [AH staff (11)]
One of the persistent challenges for AH was to
convince farmers that bananas that had been
growing effortlessly in their backyards for
generations would now require more intensive and
technical agronomics if they adopted TCBs. The
travelling workshops and legitimate business
partnerships were instrumental in guiding farmers
through this transition, in stark contrast to the
disreputable operators from the past.
4. Focusing engagement on farmer groups
From the mid 1980s, contract farming evolved in
Kenya to include more cooperative “schemes”
whereby farmers would group together and
establish their own terms of engagement with
contracting companies to maintain better control of
their stakes in the process [23]. These farmer
groups also became eligible for various government
subsidies and loan facilities, and registered groups
were visited by the agriculture extension officers
from the Ministry of Agriculture, who shared new
information about a wide range of agricultural
practices, at no cost to the individual farmers.
AH was well aware of the advantages of farmer
groups and adopted them as an explicit focus of
their engagement strategy, encouraging
independent farmers to consider the merits of
joining with other farmers to pool risk and to better
prepare for opportunities that they would be
introduced to in the ‘whole value chain’ model [4].
“Once these farmers are aware about the TC
technology, about commercial banana farming, then
we move on and talk about forming groups or use the
existing ones which might be doing another crop,
such as, avocado or maize and looking for another
enterprise.”. [Field trainer/facilitator (16)]
Professionals in the field of group dynamics and
psychology from the public and private sectors,
along with experts in TCB agronomy, trained the
AH trainers who then engaged with farmer groups.
“Mainly the lecturers were from outside…these
trainings were very exhaustive. They handled the TCB
innovation from a broad perspective…The group
dynamics that we were trained in was broad…We
were taught about the various methods of
approaching a group. It was all broad, not specific…
It was very helpful…[to learn] about group dynamics and
the way groups behave.”. [Field trainer/facilitator (2)]
A formal approach to group formation encouraged
group members to develop their own “group
constitutions” emphasizing transparency, equity in
opportunities, and participatory decision making.
These constitutions established the grounding
principles for group governance. These included,
among others: setting eligibility criteria for
nominations for specific positions of responsibility
within the group, such as chairperson, secretary,
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treasurer and banana grader, and procedures for
matters related to finance and sales of the TCB
produce.
“It is not one person who makes decisions…We discuss
the issues at hand and voice our opinions. We discuss
the issues thoroughly and see what we stand to gain. …
In this group we have some rules. For example, as a
member of the group you cannot sell your bananas to
people out there without the group deciding…You
cannot as an individual farmer decide to sell yours to
someone on your own. If you do so, you are asked to
leave the group.”. [Ngorongo FGD] (Table 1)
These group training activities emphasized the
rationale for collective action. “You must first have
a reason for forming the group. Also everyone
joining the group must be interested in that reason
for which you are forming the group. You must
also have a vision for the future of the group for it
to succeed.” [Ngorongo FGD] (Table 1). They also
focused on issues of leadership within the group.
Group leaders were elected by group members,
which fostered a sense of legitimacy within the
group, especially since they knew that they also had
the power to remove leaders who were not living
up to the group’s expectations. The growing
collective sense of the group’s power also helped
in the transition to a real sense of ownership of
the TCB technology, in both a symbolic and
economic sense.
“Yes, because unless they take it as their activity, their
project…we cannot say it is community development,
unless they own it as their project, their bananas…So
they say with or without a market, we are going to do
banana farming and we are going to do it as a
commercial venture. So those things I think are very
important. The ownership of the project also means a
lot to them.”. [Field trainer/facilitator (16)]
5. Strengthening relationships of trust through
collaborative experiential learning
Adoption of appropriate agronomy practices was
crucial for the realisation of TCB’s commercial
potential. Without sufficient TCB yields, AH would
have run the risk of being perceived as simply
another outside organization that failed farmers.
“Once farmers planted, and when we began talking
about good management and adopting a technology,
that was difficult…If it was only the technology and
everything else was the same it would have been
easier. But now one is bringing a new technology
and one is also changing the agronomy. I think that
change was a lot!”. [Consultant in community work
and group dynamics (6)]
TCB farmer groups were trained in TCB-specific
agronomic practices at demonstration plots, which
they developed with the kinds of training described
above. These plots served as ‘field schools’ for group
members.
“After forming the group, the idea [of demonstration
plots] was brought by AH so that we can have a
central place where we can all be coming to be taught
as to how to plant…That is how we started the field
school or demonstration land…Drawing upon these
learning at the field school, we started doing it on our
own farms where we did exactly what they had taught
us…”.[Farmer (4)]
“The AH has done an unusual thing here in the area.
They have trained us on good farming practices. And
they don't ask us to pay them, they pay the teacher
[Trainer from the community (16)] to come and teach
us. All they need is our presence to attend the training
sessions. We like this aspect of them training us.”
[Ngorongo FGD]
“After a lot of training they told us to try and plant
the TCB…So we saw the difference between the
traditional and the TC bananas.”. [Farmer (P15)]
The exposure visits and demonstration plots
required the AH team to be in the fields with
farmers in their own environment and communities.
Farmers found the sustained presence of AH in their
communities unusual and reassuring.
“Because I thought for myself that they can’t work all
that hard to come and visit the farmers while they are
cheating…”.[Farmer (9)]
“What made us believe is that we thought that these
people cannot come all the way here to just cheat us.
Because we were all grown-ups who could think. Like
me personally I don’t believe someone can come from
wherever to just tell you to plant something bad. So
that is why I believed them.”. [Farmer (15)]
6. Learning the marketing game
“The problems we were having before were relating
to marketing. Our marketing was not that good…
No customers, the bananas are ripening in the
shamba [orchard] and trucks are not coming to
collect them. There was that difficulty but
nowadays not much.”. [Farmer (3)]
The traditional bananas, particularly those of
smallholders, rarely made it to the local retail
market. It was imperative that farmers develop the
required skills and understanding to have better
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control over the commercial opportunities offered
by TCB. Failure to enact improvements in supply
chain and marketing practices would have caused
enormous damage to farmers’ trust: “Because you
see they would start doubting, if you are telling us
to grow bananas and if they had seen bananas
rotting somewhere or bananas were being bought at
50 shillings.” [AH staff (11)]
Because of its limited shelf-life, significant
management skills are required to maintain banana
quality until delivery to market. Farmers had little
marketing knowledge, access to non-local markets
or buffers to protect against price variations,
making them vulnerable to exploitative middle men.
Furthermore, public sector supports are scarce, as
the banana market is largely unorganized with no
government policies: “… the government actually
had a very streamlined policy for marketing tea and
coffee which are considered cash crops but banana
has always been considered a subsistence crop
which did not have this advantage.” [AH staff (12)]
The primary goals for the commercialisation of the
TCB were: (1) to develop a pool of customers with
sustained interest in bulk produce; (2) consistent
and timely supply of quality and quantity TCB
produce to win bulk buyers’ confidence; and,
consequently, (3) the establishment, over time, of a
more stable demand–supply chain. For smallholders
with limited financial resources, maintaining both
quantity and quality of production was a formidable
challenge, with many critical factors beyond their
control, such as their complete reliance on rainfall
for adequate irrigation.
“Because with supermarkets, once you go into a
contract with them, if they say we are going to
supplying you a ton per week, it is a ton per week for
52 weeks a year! I have told you our farmers are using
rain fed agriculture and under this [condition] farmers
cannot achieve this [quality and quantity]…And if you
are going into a contract [with bulk buyers] you must
ensure that you are going to meet your part of the
commitment.” [Agricultural NGO staff member (8)]
To respond to these challenges, AH integrated
marketing training for farmers in field schools,
collaborating with a private company, TechnoServe,
and with Tissue Culture Banana Enterprise Ltd.
(TCBEL), a farmer-led marketing company whose
establishment was facilitated by AH.
“And from there I have been working as an extension
officer training farmers…the post-harvest handling
and organizing the market for them…So that is why I
was saying that they need some retraining on the mar-
keting…They never knew the optimum number they
needed to plant and how much they can get from it…
I also train them on the concept of collection centers,
that is, TCB farmers have to take their produce to
collection centers instead of someone to go around
to individual farmers for collection…We also want to
train them on financial management…”.[Field trainer/
facilitator (2)]
“TCBEL really played a very big role. So they
[farmers] can now see where to sell their bananas…
the market opening is a very big and very significant
thing for us.”. [AH staff (12)]
“Probably we can replicate TCBEL as a success story
in other areas.”. [Agricultural NGO staff member (8)]
AH also expanded the exposure visits to include
marketing partners
“Well, this time we had no problem because they
[TechnoServe and TCBEL] came together with the
AH in whom we had confidence. These two entities
told us that they would take over the marketing side.
They also took the trouble to take us around to other
farmers where they were actually active, they were
helping farmers in marketing…So we knew how they
were sold. So it was something which was well
arranged, I have never seen.”. [Farmers, joint
interview (13)]
TCBEL was established as a member based
organisation with affordable membership fees for
farmers in the neighbourhood, but has evolved to a
shareholder based company run by the farmers
[24]. Given the corruption-fraught history of tea
and coffee cooperatives, TCBEL has set itself apart
in many concrete ways, including a commitment to
fair and transparent practices, such as purchasing
by weight and not by bunch count, systematic paper
work, periodic payment to farmers, and the
complete elimination of middlemen. It has also
trained staff in a wide range of skills to ensure the
consistent quality of the TCB produce.
AH’s systematic approach to TCB marketing and
commercialisation has shown results. But,
satisfaction with the TCB’s commercial
development is uneven amongst farmers. Also,
scepticism about availability of sustained markets
for TCB continues.
“But with horticulture or dairy the first market creates
demand. There will be challenges. The farmers will
not know how to meet the requirements of the
buyers…Those problems are always there. But if there
is continuity they will be handled and….So it works as
long as you build trust and the moment you build
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trust the demand–supply chain is maintained between
traders and farmers.”. [Senior Business Consultant (5)].
Limitations
Our study has two specific limitations. First, because of
its retrospective nature, participants’ accounts were vul-
nerable to normal limits of recall. Second, we had to rely
on AH staff to help us identify participants, since there
were no natural sampling frames to identify TCB
farmers and external stakeholders. As a result, we might
have failed to capture a fully representative range of
stakeholder perspectives, including more critical and
unfavourable views of AH or their CE strategies than are
represented in our final sample of individual interviews
and focus groups. Throughout our analyses we remained
conscious of this limitation and sought to take appropriate
care with the inferences we drew from our data.
Discussion
A values-based approach
AH’s approach to community engagement is grounded
in an explicit commitment to certain core values and
guiding principles. These are publicly accessible (http://
africaharvest.org/) and their substance was reflected in
many of the comments and actions of AH staff and
other stakeholders we interviewed. These core values in-
cluded a commitment to “excellence”, “institutional and
scientific integrity and accountability”, “service to farm
families, especially small landholders”, among others,
and their guiding principles included a “commitment to
partnerships that strengthen African agriculture”, a “pro-
grammatic approach based on developing the whole
value chain”, “reaching out and empowering [their]
stakeholders”, “ensuring gender equality and benefit
sharing from the development interventions”, and “focus
on impact and tangible results to the beneficiaries”,
among others. This explicit values-based approach
served as a public declaration by AH that it was mindful
of the farmers’ previous experiences with unfair partner-
ships and was committed to not perpetuating these prac-
tices. Of more immediate concern for our case study,
the guiding values served as design constraints for its CE
strategy; an internally-generated framework for assessing
the implications of its activities for its stakeholders.
Although our findings do not permit strong conclusions
about its efficacy, we believe the explicit application of
values as design constraints for CE strategies is a very
promising avenue for improving CE planning and
management. In this case, the approach appears to have
facilitated strong relationships that helped to restore
farmers’ willingness to place trust in new partners, with
one another, and in a novel technology and its associated
agricultural practices.
Key features of the CE strategy
Four key features of the AH’s CE approach appear to be
critical to its effectiveness. First, the decision to intro-
duce the TCB was informed by empirical evidence that
was collected through explicit processes of formative
research that were part of the CE strategy. Second, CE
was geared towards systematically transferring skills to
farmers and other relevant players, a foundational aspect
of ‘technology transfer’. Exposure visits, group learning,
inputs by trainers drawn from within the communities,
and field schools were critical contexts for engagement
among stakeholders and provided opportunities for
authentic relationships to develop, which formed the
basis for all the critical points of cooperation and trust
that are required throughout the scale-up of the TCB
operation. Third, by seeking partnerships with both pub-
lic and private sector SHs, AH effectively expanded the
skills, expertise and experience at its disposal to engage
farmers, and help them engage with one another. In the
process, it also created opportunities to enhance the
capabilities of other relevant SHs, such as academic
institutions, public and private research laboratories, and
agricultural nurseries, while remaining front-and-centre
in establishing and maintaining their trustworthiness for
farmers, in particular.
Fourth, AH staff made concerted efforts to keep the
promises they made to farmers. In the context of eroded
trust, farmers began their journey with AH with scepti-
cism. Kept promises—a commitment to “match words
with action”—gradually won AH the farmers’ confidence.
As well, the model for the TCB scale-up put decision-
making in the hands of the farmers and their collectives,
which represented a fundamental departure from the
“old ways” and fuelled a sense of ownership of the
innovation. Importantly, the AH engagement strategy
required farmers to become knowledgeable and skilled
through the full value chain of the TCB, breaking old
patterns established by previous partners of cultivating
farmers’ dependencies on them for key aspects of the
production and delivery processes.
Attention to the human dimensions of complex
partnerships
Training and capacity building are typically viewed as
separate categories of activity from “core” Research &
Development (R&D) activities for new technologies.
Although this mind-set has begun to shift [25], there are
few clear examples of how training and capacity building
activities have been designed and effectively integrated
with the introduction of a new technology. AH’s TCB
CE strategy demonstrates how training and capacity
building efforts contribute directly to the development
of a human infrastructure [26] to further the aims of the
initiative across the TCB value chain. Given the farmers’
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collective experience with exploitative partnerships in
the past, AH staff understood clearly that their trust-
worthiness, i.e., the farmers’ willingness to place trust in
them and in the technology [27] could be the difference
between the success and failure of the TCB. More gener-
ally, this attention to trustworthiness requires intensive
engagement and listening to stakeholders, even prior to
the execution of the project, to understand where they are
starting from—what experiences have they had, and how
have these experiences shape their attitudes about the
specific project at hand. And it requires sensitivity and
thoughtful consideration of how all the actions, behav-
iours, and commitments the SHs will experience in the
process of being “engaged” will enhance, or detract from,
their confidence in placing trust in their new partners.
The success of the AH TCB introduction demonstrates
the critical importance of follow-through and maintaining
a sustained presence in the lives of the collaborating SHs
and committing to authentic relationships.
The AH results demonstrate how CE and the complex
web of relationships it produces between implementers
and SHs [26] can facilitate a wide range of complex in-
teractions including extensive training, the establishment
of new business partnerships and regulatory relation-
ships. The scope of these activities/opportunities and the
relationships that facilitate them, stand in contrast to the
more mechanistic approaches to CE (e.g., community
advisory boards (CABs)), which typically have a more
remote and limited influence on the day to day details of
implementation. The findings suggest that effective CE
must “break the plane” of the typical advisory, or ‘mes-
sage-delivery’ models of CE to create significant relation-
ships and shared experience. It is through these that
sound judgements about trustworthiness can be made,
not simply through the proceedings of advisory commit-
tees and other structural mechanisms. AH offers a useful
example of what is required to make this happen.
Challenges
In cultural terms, the re-imagining of banana cultivation
from a ‘back-yard’ and ‘woman’s crop’ to a scalable com-
mercial enterprise introduces new incentives for men to
‘take over’ roles that have traditionally been performed
by women. Although the creation of new economic
opportunities for men is not, in itself, a threat to the
well-being of women, avoidance of this type of displace-
ment and disruption of women’s economic opportunities
has been recognized by AH as a central plank in its
mission and an on-going challenge. As well, there are
inherent challenges for the scale-up of TCB as an eco-
nomic venture, such as the heavy demand for water in
an environment that is increasingly dry. Anticipating,
and fairly accounting for, this type of externality is a
chronic challenge for CE and fair research partnerships
Conclusions
We undertook this case study, in part, to help explain
the perceived success of AH’s CE strategy. Our findings
suggest that AH’s explicit articulation of its guiding
values provided critical design constraints for its CE
strategy. The resulting CE efforts helped to restore and
build relationships of trust between farmers, AH and a
wide range of other stakeholders. AH’s attention to the
interests of farmers across the ‘whole value chain’ gave
rise to training and capacity building efforts that were
effectively integrated into the development of the com-
mercial enterprise. Our findings suggest new ways of
conceptualizing the relationship between CE and the
design and delivery of new technologies for global health
and global development.
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